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2007]
RAG CUMBERLAND v. DEP: AN AGENCY'S VOLTE-FACE
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - WHEN DO COURTS STOP
DEFERRING AND START JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION?
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century,
coal mines continue to be significantly dangerous workplaces and
have been the site of over 100 thousand deaths in the past century
alone.1 In response to the inherent dangers and risks miners face
upon descending into these treacherous work pits, Congress and
state legislatures have passed new and amended existing mine
safety statutes throughout the twentieth century, including the Fed-
eral Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, and the somewhat
ambiguous Bituminous Coal Mine Act of 1961 in Pennsylvania
(BCMA or the Act).2 The Pennsylvania Legislature passed the
BCMA to "protect the health and promote the safety of all persons
employed in and about the mines;" however, problems interpreting
some of the Act's provisions have led to efficiency and safety con-
cerns. 3 The success of such legislation, even with its ambiguities,
coupled with technological advances, remains obvious: in 1910,
coal mining accidents caused 2821 deaths; in 1961, the year of the
enactment of the BCMA, coal mine deaths dropped to 1431; and in
2005, coal mine deaths fell to twenty-two. 4 Later regulatory acts,
such as the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,
brought an even greater decrease in mine deaths. 5
As part of the BCMA, the legislature included a statutory provi-
sion calling for "pre-shift examinations" within three hours before a
shift starts.6 These pre-shift examinations may prevent life-threat-
ening and hazardous conditions, which, if left unchecked, could
1. See United States Mining Fatalities Lowest Ever in 2005, as Companies Value
Safety, Pt.Trs COAL OUTLOOK (Platts, New York, NY), Jan. 9, 2006, at 1, available at
2006 WLNR 1239665 (noting mine fatality statistics).
2. See id. (noting federal legislation); Bituminous Coal Mine Act, 52 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 701-104 (2007) (exemplifying legislation passed to further mine safety stan-
dard in twentieth century).
3. See 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 701-104(a) (noting purpose of Act).
4. See United States Mining Fatalities, supra note 1, at 1 (comparing mine fatali-
ties from 1910 through 2005).
5. See id. (noting efficiency of regulatory acts in raising mine safety).
6. See 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 701-228(a) (requiring pre-shift examinations).
(285)
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lead to explosions or other mining tragedies. 7 In 2003, for exam-
ple, inadequate pre-shift examinations contributed to a mine explo-
sion, claiming the life of a twenty-one year old miner and injuring
two others.8 Consequently, the necessity of such inspections is un-
disputed. 9 Disputes did arise, however, over the timing require-
ments for inspections under the Act.10 In RAG Cumberland Resources
LP v. DEP (RAG Cumberland)," the Environmental Hearing Board
(EHB) deferred to the Department of Environmental Protection's
(DEP) interpretation of the BCMA requiring inspections each time
miners entered the mine, even though such an interpretation
lacked conclusive, supportive evidence. 12
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court disagreed with the
EHB and concluded the EHB improperly deferred to the DEP in-
terpretation of the Act because the DEP offered no rationale for an
interpretation that differed greatly from the DEP's prior working
interpretation.13 The court concluded the interpretation of "shift"
as a matter of time, as opposed to an activity involving workers, was
contrary to the "peculiar" definition of "shift" in the mining indus-
try.14 Noting the technical definition, the commonwealth court ap-
propriately referred to the Statutory Construction Act (SCA), which
assists in discerning ambiguous statutes. 15 The court, moreover, de-
termined the well-established industry interpretation of "shift" was
appropriate and therefore denied deference to the DEP's new in-
terpretation, effectively reinstating the historical interpretation.' 6
This Note examines the scope of judicial deference to agency
interpretations of legislation with regard to both historical interpre-
tations and the technical definitions of statutory terminology. 17
7. See Cody, Site of Fatality Blasted as 'Poorly Managed, Operated Mine,'THE U.S.
CoAL REVIEW, Oct. 27, 2003, at 1 (noting dangerous conditions due to lack of pre-
shift examinations).
8. See id. (noting 2003 accident due to inadequate pre-shift examinations).
9. See RAG Cumberland v. DEP, 869 A.2d 1065, 1067 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005)
(noting petitioners' inspection arguments).
10. See id. at 1068 (discussing mine operators' appeal of DEP order).
11. 869 A.2d 1065 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
12. See id. (noting EHB conclusions of law).
13. See id. at 1072 (refusing to give deference to DEP's "new" interpretation of
BCMA section 7 01-228(a)).
14. See id. (discussing multiple meanings of "shift").
15. See id. at 1069 (noting appropriateness of SCA).
16. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (refusing to adopt DEP's new defini-
tion of "shift" and holding "shift" as referring to block of time, not group of
workers).
17. See, e.g., ChristopherJ. Nowicki, Note, A Step Back From Chevron? An Analy-
sis of Kelley v. EPA, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 221, 242-44 (1995) (explaining Chevron
2
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Section II of this Note provides a summary of the facts of RAG Cum-
berland.18 Section III provides the relevant background, case law
and statutes surrounding the BCMA and the SCA.19 Section IV dis-
cusses the commonwealth court's analysis of the EHB's decision in
RAG Cumberland as well as relevant statutes and case law.20 Section
V analyzes the commonwealth court's decision, considering
whether it was proper, appropriate and supported by law.2 1 Finally,
Section VI of this Note evaluates the impact RAG Cumberland may
have on agencies performing statutory interpretations, especially
with regard to technical definitions. 22
II. FACTS
In RAG Cumberland, Cumberland and Emerald Mines (petition-
ers) operated underground bituminous coal mines in Greene
County, Pennsylvania. 23 Petitioners operated their mines seven
days a week; they had three primary shifts, with pre-shift safety ex-
aminations occurring within a three-hour time period before each
primary shift.24 Both mines had scheduled workers to enter the
mine at times after the primary shift start time.25 There were no
additional pre-shift examinations conducted prior to the entry of
these later workers because the mine, operators concluded the ex-
aminations conducted before the primary shift ensured the safety
of these additional workers. 26
doctrine). In federal cases, reviewing courts defer to only reasonable agency inter-
pretations and not unreasonable interpretations. See id.
18. For a discussion of the facts in RAG Cumberland, see infra notes 23-38 and
accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the judicial and statutory background to the BCMA
and the SCA, see infra notes 39-88 and accompanying text.
20. For a narrative analysis of the commonwealth court's decision in RAG
Cumberland, see infra notes 89-141 and accompanying text.
21. For a critical analysis of RAG Cumberland, see infra notes 142-62 and ac-
companying text.
22. For a discussion of the probable impact of RAG Cumberland on agency
statutory interpretation and statutory construction, see infra notes 163-72 and ac-
companying text.
23. See RAG Cumberland v. DEP, 869 A.2d 1065, 1066 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005)
(outlining case background).
24. See id. at 1066-67 (providing shift and examination schedule). At Cumber-
land mine, the three primary shifts began at 7:00 a.m., 3:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.
while additional workers entered the mines at 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. See id. At
Emerald mine, the primary shifts began at 12:00 a.m., 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., with
additional workers entering the mine at 6:30 a.m. and 1:30 p.m., depending on the
day. See id. at 1067.
25. See id. at 1066-67 (providing shift schedule).
26. See id. at 1067 (noting treatment of additional workers).
3
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Mining regulations promulgated in BCMA section 228(a)
guided the pre-shift examinations in both mines.27 BCMA section
228(a) provides, in relevant part:
In a gassy mine, within three hours immediately preceding
the beginning of a coal-producing shift, and before any
workmen in such shift... enter the underground areas of
such mine, certified persons . . .shall make an examina-
tion, as prescribed in this section, of such areas .... 28
On March 18, 2003, the DEP advised petitioners they were in viola-
tion of section 228 (a) and issued compliance orders due to the lack
of examinations within the three hours immediately preceding the
entry of workers at "odd" start times. 29 Petitioners appealed the
compliance orders, and the EHB consolidated the matters.30
The DEP, meanwhile, filed a motion for summary judgment.31
Nonetheless, the parties disputed the meaning of the term "shift" in
section 228(a); the DEP interpreted it as a group of workers, and
the petitioners defined it as a period of time.3 2 The EHB granted
the DEP's summary judgment motion. 33 The mine operators ap-
pealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court for review of the
EHB decision to grant the motion for summary judgment. 34
27. See id. at 1068 (excerpting portions of statute).
28. See 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 701-228 (2007) (providing mine inspection re-
quirements); RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d. at 1068 (providing basis for applicability
of statute).
29. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1067 (explaining basis of compliance
orders). The compliance orders required petitioners to take one of three actions:
(1) modify shift schedules to consolidate the entry of workers to the times when
pre-shift examinations were then being conducted; (2) conduct additional pre-
shift examinations for all shifts beginning at "odd" times or (3) compress pre-shift
examinations being performed so that those examinations fell within the three-
hour period preceding the entry of workers on more than one shift. See id.
30. See id. at 1068 (noting procedural history).
31. See id. (noting summary judgment motion).
32. See id. (outlining DEP and petitioners' lower court arguments).
33. See id. (noting appeal of EHB decision). The EHB stated:
We detect no ambiguity of any significance in [s]ection 228(a). The sec-
tion unequivocally requires preshift examinations for coal-producing and
non-coal-producing shifts. As discussed above, the effort to define shift as
having two different, separate meanings is artificial. Whether one defines
a shift by reference to the workers or the period of time that they work,
the fact remains that separate groups of workers and/or separate blocks
of time cannot be viewed as the same shift. Where a statute is clear, that
[sic] is no need to engage in interpretation.
Id. (quoting Op. and Order on Mots. for Summ.J. at 9-10, RAG Cumberland v. DEP,
EHB Docket No. 2003-067-L (consolidated with 2003-068-L) (issued Jan. 27,
2004)).
34. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1068 (noting petitioners' appeal).
4
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The commonwealth court found that "shift" had a specific
meaning in the mining industry, which referenced a designated
block of time, and petitioners offered significant evidence to sup-
port this definition. 35 The court found the DEP's "new" interpreta-
tion of section 228 (a) was "contrary to the peculiar and appropriate
meaning of 'shift' that had developed in the coal [-] mining indus-
try. 13 6 Due to the complex nature of mining and the need for flexi-
bility for the entrance and exit of mine workers, the DEP's
interpretation was not granted superiority. 37 The commonwealth
court reversed the EHB, ruling that "shift" referred to a block of
time and not to the entry of workers into a mine; therefore, the pre-
shift examination conducted by petitioners sufficed, and they were
not in violation of section 228(a). 38
III. BACKGROUND
Statutory interpretation is a multi-faceted and complex effort
to ascertain both the meaning behind specific statutory language
and the ultimate purpose of a statute.3 9 The goal of construing an
ambiguous statutory term is to "discern and to accomplish the in-
tent of the Legislature in enacting the statute in question. ' 40 A stat-
ute can be ambiguous when it contains terms that have both
35. See id. at 1069-70 (stating reasoning in case). Petitioners argued that the
EHB erred in failing to recognize the technical definition of "shift," as a time pe-
riod rather than a group of workers and by ignoring historical administrative pre-
cedent. See id. at 1069. The DEP argued that "shift" should be defined according
to its common dictionary usage as a group of people working with other groups or
a scheduled period of work or duty. See id. at 1069. Further, petitioners offered
extensive evidence of a historically applied definition of "shift" as to pertain to a
period of time. See id. at 1069-70. The evidence included the testimony of DEP
officials, mine inspectors and mine safety managers. See id. at 1070. The historical
interpretation prior to 2003 was that a pre-shift examination covered the entire
shift and miners could "enter the mine at any time during that shift without trig-
gering the need for a new examination." See id.
36. See id. at 1072 (discussing court's ruling on DEP's interpretation of
"shift").
37. See id. (dismissing DEP's view on inspections as "not sustainable").
38. See id. (providing court's conclusion).
39. See generally O'Rourke v. Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 778 A.2d 1194, 1201 (Pa.
2001) (noting "cardinal rule of all statutory construction" is contextual interpreta-
tion). See also Swartley v. Harris, 40 A.2d 409, 410-11 (Pa. 1944) (describing appli-
cability of legislative purpose in statutory interpretation); Knecht v. Med. Serv.
Ass'n, 143 A.2d 820, 825 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (explaining SCA).
40. See Commonwealth's Mem. of Law in Supp. of its Mot. for Summ. J. at 6,
RAG Cumberland v. DEP, EHB Docket No. 2003-068-L (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1901 et seq., 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921) (outlining statutory construction rules).
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technical and common definitions, but neither the statute nor the
legislature have indicated which definition applies. 41
The Pennsylvania Legislature recognized this possibility of con-
fusion, and thus, through SCA section 1903, the legislature adopted
an interpretation provision stating in part: "technical words and
phrases and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropri-
ate meaning ... shall be construed according to such . . . meaning
or definition."42 The statute construes general words according to
preceding particular words and common words "according to rules
of grammar and according to their common and approved us-
age. '43 Difficulties arise under the Act, however, when the techni-
cal and common definitions are conflicting. 44
A. Plain Language and Technical Interpretations
The Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the BCMA to provide
protection for Pennsylvania's miners.45 BCMA section 228 (a) estab-
lishes a duty for mine examiners to conduct pre-shift examinations
within three hours prior to the beginning of each coal-producing
shift.46 Prior to the 2001 decision United Mine Workers of America v.
DEP and Eighty Four Mining Co. (United Mine Workers),47 the DEP in-
terpreted and defined the term "shift" as a block of time and not as
a group of workers. 48
41. Compare Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 876 A.2d 904, 909 (Pa. 2005) (favoring
method of interpreting statutory terms that focuses on common definition), with
Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 598 A.2d 1057, 1060 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1991) (noting absence of definition of statutory terms triggers rules of statutory
construction to discern meaning).
42. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1903(a) (2006) (providing rules for construction
of words and phrases in Pennsylvania statutes). See also Browning-Ferris, Inc., 598
A.2d at 1060 (applying SCA section 1903(a), which adopted technical definition of
terms to statute).
43. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1903(a) (providing usage rules for common words
and definitions).
44. For a discussion of contrasting technical and common definitions, see
supra note 41 and accompanying text.
45. See 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 701-104(a) (2007) (providing purpose of BCMA).
46. See id. § 701-228(a) (providing duties of mine examiners). The Act called
for an examination to be completed prior to the "beginning of a coal-producing
shift," which was defined as "a shift primarily intended for coal production rather
than for purposes of construction, maintenance and housekeeping even though
some coal production may be incident to such purposes." RAG Cumberland v. DEP,
869 A.2d 1065, 1069 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (citing 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 701-
103(22)) (explaining definition of statutory language).
47. EHB Docket No. 2001-081-K, 2001 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 73 (issued Dec. 5,
2001), affrd, No. 22 CD 2002 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
48. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1071 (establishing prior DEP interpreta-
tion of statute).
6
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In United Mine Workers, defendant Eighty-Four Mining Com-
pany requested and obtained a variance under section 228(a) to
allow the mine to conduct pre-shift examinations every eight hours
rather than every three hours before a shift.49 On appeal, the EHB
held the variance "would not accord equal or greater protection to
personnel and property."50 In fact, the EHB found the variance
offered less protection.51 The EHB did not consider the definition
of "shift" within the BCMA, but nonetheless, it agreed with the
DEP's conclusion that each group of miners constitutes a shift for
which an examination must be conducted.5 2
Later cases noted that when there is an ambiguity in the mean-
ing of the words, a reviewing court should refer to the SCA to iden-
tify possible resolutions. 53 One such case utilizing the SCA in the
interpretation of technical and common terms is Sternlicht v. Ster-
nlicht (Sternlicht).54 In Sternlicht, a mother and father established a
broker's account for their daughter, and the father began to with-
draw funds from the account for his own personal use. 55 The fa-
ther argued he was allowed to do so because the establishment of
the trust fell under the common definition of "gift."56 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, however, found the statutory language was
"clear and unambiguous" and would not consider the common def-
inition of the term because statutory language clearly designated an
49. See United Mine Workers, 2001 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 73, at **4-5 (explaining
basis of variance). The BCMA requires, in part, examinations to be conducted
"within three hours immediately preceding the beginning of a coal-producing shift
.... .52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 701-228(a). The DEP, however, approved a variance
that allowed defendant mine operators to "conduct pre-shift examinations within
three hours preceding the beginning of any 8 hour interval during which any per-
son is scheduled to work or travel underground and ... [to] establish the 8 hour
intervals of time subject to the examination at Mine 84." United Mine Workers, 2001
Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 73, at **4-5.
50. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1071 (explaining facts involved in United
Mine Workers).
51. See United Mine Workers, 2001 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 73, at *38 (finding such
variance affords less protection than section 228(a)).
52. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (noting United Mine Workers decision
and its impact).
53. See Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 876 A.2d 904, 909 (Pa. 2005) (noting applicability
of SCA).
54. See id. (using SCA in its interpretation of terms).
55. See id. at 905-06 (discussing background facts). The father argued the
common definition of "gift" requires donative intent, which was lacking in this
situation, but the court concluded the technical statutory definition of gift applies,
which does not require donative intent because transfers into the account are ir-
revocable. See id. at 910-11.
56. See id. at 911 (citing father's argument).
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alternative understanding. 57 The court concluded that "[a]bsent
ambiguity, the plain meaning of the statute controls. 58
B. Purpose of the Act
A court may consult the purpose of an act or statute in order to
ascertain the meaning behind ambiguous terminology.59 United
States v. DuPont De Nemours (DuPont)60 demonstrates the occasional
need to interpret and consult the statutory purpose in ascertaining
the correct interpretation of a statute. 61
In DuPont, a dispute arose over whether DuPont was responsi-
ble for paying oversight costs to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) for a privately funded cleanup. 62 The Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act's
(CERCLA) National Priorities List included a DuPont-operated in-
dustrial site as a potential threat to human life. 63 The EPA devel-
oped a remedial plan for DuPont and then supervised DuPont's
cleanup and recovery operations.6 4 The EPA subsequently at-
tempted to recover the cleanup costs from DuPont; however, Du-
Pont brought suit to preclude recovery of such costs. 65
The District Court for the District of Delaware barred the EPA
from recovery based on precedent and prior interpretations of the
statute. 66 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
analyzed the plain language and purpose of the statute and granted
57. See id. (noting conclusion). The relevant statutory language in this case
stated "a transfer made pursuant to section 5309 is irrevocable ...." See id. at 910.
58. See Sternlicht, 876 A.2d at 910 (providing conclusion on matter). Even
though the father relied on the common definition of "gift," the statutory context
and construction created an alternative definition and application of the term gift
that was controlling in the case before the court. See id. at 914.
59. See United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161, 169 (3d
Cir. 2005) (noting clear language does not necessitate inquiry into purpose; logi-
cally follows that unclear language requires inquiry into purpose).
60. 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005).
61. See id. at 169 (expressing utility in consulting statutory objectives when
determining appropriateness of agency interpretation of statute).
62. See id. at 163 (noting background facts).
63. See id. (discussing background of case).
64. See id. (explaining cleanup involvement).
65. See DuPont, 432 F.3d at 169 (noting pre-case history).
66. See id. (describing procedural background). The court noted precedent
established that an administrative agency could not recover oversight costs from a
cleanup operation. See id. (citing United States v. Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d 1265 (3d
Cir. 1993)). CERCLA's cost recovery provision provided that responsible parties
are liable for "all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
government..." and "any other necessary costs of response incurred ...." See id.
at 169-70 (emphasis added). The DuPont court held that costs associated with su-
pervision of cleanup were thus recoverable under CERCLA's cost recovery provi-
8
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supervisory costs despite the prior decision.6 7 The court found that
not doing so would dissuade the EPA from supervising cleanups,
therefore partially destroying the purpose of the statute itself.68
The court further commented that in considering sources to con-
sult for interpreting statutes, "relevant legislative history, along with
consideration of the statutory objectives, can be useful in illuminat-
ing [statutory] meaning."69
C. Deference to Agency Interpretation
Historically, courts defer to an agency's interpretation of a stat-
ute and its terminology so long as the interpretation is consistent
with legislative intent and is not unreasonable. 70 The reviewing
court's role is to determine whether the agency's interpretation of
the regulation was consistent with the statute under which the regu-
lation was promulgated. 7' The court must read the language to
"harmoniz[e] with the subject matter and its general purpose and
object. The general design and purpose of the law is to be kept in
view .... "72
sion, despite its earlier decision in Rohm & Haas, where the court denied such
recovery. See id. at 170.
67. See id. at 174 (referring to plain language of statute).
68. See id. (explaining that if supervisory costs were not recoverable, EPA
would be discouraged from supervising cleanup, thereby reducing appeal of
cleanup actions).
69. See id. at 169 (citing Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600
(2004)) (noting sources useful in consulting to determine meaning of ambiguous
terms).
70. See Street Road Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 876 A.2d 346,
354 (Pa. 2005) (citing Pennsylvania. v. Gilmour Mfg., 822 A.2d 676, 679 (Pa.
2003)) (stating role of agency interpretations of ambiguous terms and statutes);
DEP v. N. Am. Refractories Co., 791 A.2d 461, 464 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (citing
Pelton v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 523 A.2d 1104 (Pa. 1987)) (discussing courts' role
in interpreting regulations: "courts defer to an administrative agency's interpreta-
tion of its own regulations unless that interpretation is unreasonable"); Bethenergy
Mines Inc. v. DEP, 676 A.2d 711, 715 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (noting reviewing
court will ordinarily defer to agency's interpretation of ambiguous terms). Impor-
tantly, according to the SCA, technical terms shall be construed according to their
"peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition." See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1903
(2006) (providing rules of statutory construction and interpretation); see also Com-
monwealth's Mem. of Law in Supp. of its Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 40, at 7,
RAG Cumberland v. DEP, EHB Docket No. 2003-068-L.
71. See N. Am. Reftactories Co., 791 A.2d at 464 (describing reviewing court's
role in statutory interpretation).
72. See Swartley v. Harris, 40 A.2d 409, 411 (Pa. 1944) (discussing general pur-
pose of law is to be kept in view and ultimate goal must be kept intact). In this
case, the "ultimate purpose" can be regarded as the safe, yet efficient, operation of
Pennsylvania coal mines, while the present goal is to ensure safety within the mine
without disturbing the efficiency and productivity of such mines. See RAG Cumber-
9
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Courts often apply a two-step test when reviewing an agency's
interpretation of a regulation it administers. 73 The first step is to
review the agency's interpretation of statutory language, which will
become controlling unless it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation. ' 74 The second step is for the court to review
whether the regulations are "consistent with the statute under
which they are promulgated." 75
One case applying the two-step test is United States v. Larionoff
(Larionofj).76 In Larionoff seven enlisted members of the United
States Navy sued the Navy to recover re-enlistment bonuses prom-
ised to them under a federal statute. 77 The United States Supreme
Court found the applicable regulations governing bonus payments
contained numerous ambiguities, but the Court did not analyze the
meanings of the ambiguous terms.78 Instead, the Court considered
and effectuated the Navy's interpretation as enforcing agency. 79
The Court opined that the Navy's reading was correct because the
land v. DEP, 869 A.2d 1065, 1072 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (discussing relationship
between efficiency and safety goals).
73. See Pelton, 523 A.2d at 1107 (explaining test to be applied to review agency
interpretation).
74. See id. (quoting United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977)) (ex-
plaining first step of test).
75. See id. (quoting Larionoff 431 U.S. at 872) (noting second step in analysis).
76. See United States v. Larionoff 431 U.S. 864 (1977) (relying on administrative
interpretation of statute without further examination).
77. See id. at 865 (noting background facts). The statute that allowed for the
reenlistment bonus was former Title 37, section 30 8 (g) of the United States Code,
which provided:
Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense . . . a
member who is designated as having a critical military skill and who is
entitled to a bonus computed under subsection (a) of this section upon
his first reenlistment may be paid an additional amount not more than
four times the amount of that bonus. The additional amount shall be
paid in equal yearly installments in each year of the reenlistment period
Id. at 866. This statute was in place when plaintiff Larionoff enlisted in the Navy
for four years, and he chose to enroll in a specialty that he knew would entitle him
to a re-enlistment bonus. See id. at 866-67. After cnlisting and agreeing to re-enlist,
but before plaintiff began serving the re-enlistment period, plaintiffs specialty was
struck from the eligible positions to receive the re-enlistment bonus, and he was
denied the ability to collect a re-enlistment bonus. See id. at 867. The government
contended that the eligibility to collect such bonuses should be applied as of the
time the member completed the initial enlistment and entered into the extended
agreement. See id. at 870-71.
78. See id. at 872 (noting ambiguities in regulations).
79. See id. (noting treatment of consistent agency interpretation). Specifi-
cally, the court noted "the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation,
which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation." Id. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414.
(1945)).
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Navy's continuous interpretation was not inconsistent with the
wording of the regulation. 0 The Court, however, did hold that the
regulation itself was contrary to Congress's purposes in enacting the
relevant statute.81
As such, despite the usual need for deference, and even
though the agency's interpretation of the regulation was consistent
with prior practice and otherwise correct, the Court found the reg-
ulation itself was inconsistent with legislative intent and thus inva-
lid.8 2 In Larionoff the Court also provided several ground rules a
court may heed when determining proper deference: (1) an
agency's prior, consistent interpretation is valid so long as the inter-
pretation is consistent with the regulation or statute; (2) a court
does not question a regulation that is plainly consistent with the
statute and (3) a regulation, if inconsistent with the statute it is
promulgated under, will be invalid, even if the regulation is prop-
erly administered.83
An agency's conclusion that a term or statute is unambiguous
and clear does not eliminate a reviewing court's ability to question
the agency's conclusion and interpretation.8 4 If the agency's inter-
pretation of a statute or its language is contrary to the purpose of
the statute or is "unwise or violative of legislative intent, courts
[will] disregard the regulation."8 5 Both courts and agencies have
found it helpful to consider the context in which a statutory term
appears to decide the meaning of ambiguous terms.8 6 The defer-
80. See id. at 873 (holding agency's interpretation must be given deference so
long as it is not inconsistent or plainly erroneous).
81. See Larionoff 431 U.S. at 873 (holding regulations "were contrary to the
manifest purposes of Congress in enacting [the applicable statute]").
82. See id. (noting although Navy correctly interpreted regulations, regulation
was nonetheless invalid).
83. See id. (concluding issues of law in case).
84. See RAG Cumberland v. DEP, 869 A.2d 1065, 1068 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005)
(citing Op. and Order on Mots. for Summ. J. at 9-10, RAG Cumberland v. DEP, EHB
Docket No. 2003-067-L (consolidated with 2003-068-L) (issued Jan. 27, 2004) (cit-
ing Eagle Envtl. v. DEP, 833 A.2d 805, 808 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003))) (noting that
Board's conclusion that terms were unambiguous was in error and there was need
to interpret terms).
85. See Phila. Suburban Corp. v. Pa. Bd. of Fin. & Revenue, 635 A.2d 116, 118
(Pa. 1993) (explaining that legislative intent overrides deference given to agency's
interpretation of statute/terms). See also Girard Sch. Dist. v. Pittenger, 392 A.2d
261, 263 (Pa. 1978) (stating that when interpretation adopted by administrative
agency unwise or violative of legislative intent, it will be disregarded). Previous
courts have ruled that when an agency's interpretation of a statute is clearly erro-
neous, such interpretation will also be disregarded. See Stoystown Borough Water
Auth. v. Pa. DEP & Solar Fuel Co., 729 A.2d 170, 174 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
86. See Commonwealth's Mot. for Summ.J. at 6, RAG Cumberland v. DEP, EHB
Docket No. 2003-068-L (citing O'Rourke v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 778 A.2d 1194, 1201
11
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ence owed to the enforcing agency must also yield to evidence that
the agency's present interpretation is a volte-face of the agency's
previous and consistent interpretation of the statute.8 7 In such
cases, the previous interpretation will continue to be enforced, so
long as it is in line with the statute and the legislature's purpose. 88
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In RAG Cumberland, the petitioners argued the EHB incorrectly
interpreted the BCMA and erroneously concluded they were in vio-
lation of the BCMA. 89 Petitioners claimed the EHB erred in its in-
terpretation of BCMA section 228(a) because the EHB failed to
recognize the technical definition of "shift" in the mining industry
and ignored historical administrative interpretations of the Act.90
Petitioners urged the EHB to apply the technical definition of the
term "shift" and thus conclude that no violation of section 228(a)
existed. 9 1
The DEP, on the other hand, argued that "shift," as defined in
the common dictionary, refers to a group of workers and not a
block of time and is the common and approved definition in the
mining industry.92 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court con-
cluded the purpose of the statute is to guarantee the safe yet effi-
cient operation of Pennsylvania's mines.9 3  The Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court refused to give deference to such an inter-
pretation due to the EHB's departure from the industry's interpre-
(Pa. 2001)) (acknowledging that context is important in making determinations of
appropriate meaning in statutory language); Knecht v. Med. Serv. Assoc. of Pa., 143
A.2d 820, 824-25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (noting context must be considered during
interpretation).
87. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (citing Pa. Sch. Bd. Assoc., Inc. v.
Pub. Sch. Employees' Ret. Bd., 863 A.2d 432, 441 (Pa. 2004)) (recognizing limited
deference due to agency interpretations).
88. See id. (discussing appropriateness of agency interpretations). In RAG
Cumberland, the shift in interpretation can be attributed to the decision in United
Mine Workers, after which the DEP believed that each miner is a "shift" for which an
examination of the entire mine must be completed. See id. See also Larionoff 431
U.S. at 872-73 (noting consistently applied interpretation can be treated as bind-
ing, so long as is consistent with statute being interpreted); Winslow-Quattlebaum
v. Maryland Ins. Co., 752 A.2d 878, 881 (Pa. 2000) (noting Pennyslvania courts will
defer to administrative agency's interpretation "absent fraud, bad faith, abuse of
discretion or clearly arbitrary action").
89. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1069 (noting petitioners' argument that
EHB incorrectly interpreted requirements in BCMA section 228(a)).
90. See id. (presenting petitioners' arguments on appeal).
91. See id. (restating petitioners' arguments on appeal).
92. See id. (presenting respondent's arguments on appeal).
93. See id. at 1072 (stating purpose of section 228(a) is to provide safety and
ensure efficiency).
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tation and prior DEP implementation of pre-shift examination
requirements. 94 Judge Flaherty dissented, opining that the court
should give strict deference to the DEP's interpretation of section
228(a). 95
A. The Technical, Historical Definition of "Shift" in the Mining
Industry
The commonwealth court immediately addressed the crux of
the DEP's (respondent) argument that the common definition of
"shift" should be applied when terms are ambiguous. 96 The court
reversed the EHB's holding that the common usage of "shift," as a
group of workers, should apply in this situation. 97 The court re-
ceived little help from the dictionary definition of "shift," as it listed
contradictory entries that supported both parties' arguments. 98 In-
stead, the commonwealth court looked to the BCMA and rules of
statutory construction for guidance. 99
The court found the BCMA lacked a definition for "shift,"
which added to the confusion and ambiguity of the Act. 100 Apply-
ing the rules of statutory construction, the court also consulted the
context in which "shift" appeared. 10 1 In doing so, the court noted
the language of section 228(a) refers to "workmen in such shift"
and to a "person on a non-coal producing shift," which supported
the meaning of shift being a period of time and not a group of
workers. 10 2 The court found the EHB failed to consult tools of stat-
94. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (refusing to give deference to United
Mine Workers' holding concerning requirements under section 228(a)).
95. See id. at 1074 (Flaherty, S.J., dissenting) (arguing for extreme deference
to agency in conflicting interpretation scenario).
96. See id. at 1069 (majority opinion) (addressing statutory construction
argument).
97. See id. (disagreeing with DEP's conclusions).
98. See id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2095
(Merriam-Webster, Inc. 2002)) (emphasis omitted) (noting dictionary definition
of shift). According to the definition in the dictionary, the term "shift" refers to "a
group of people who work or occupy themselves in turn with other groups . . . a
change of one group of people (as workers or students) for another in regular
alternation [;] a scheduled period of work or duty)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY 2095 (Merriam-Webster, Inc. 2002).
99. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1069 (referencing BCMA and SCA).
100. See id. (noting conflict in defining "shift"). The court found that al-
though "coal-producing shift" was defined, the statute lacked a definition of the
term "shift," which indicated that section 228(a) was not "clear and free from all
ambiguity." See id. (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(b)).
101. See id. (consulting context of "shift").
102. See id. at 1069 (addressing contextual arguments).
13
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utory construction and instead, only gave deference to the common
usage definition of the term "shift."'0 3
The court specifically observed that once the EHB concluded
the statute was unambiguous, the EHB then failed to give proper
consideration to the petitioners' substantial evidence, including im-
portant testimony and depositions, indicating an alternate techni-
cal definition of "shift."'1 4 The court recognized the definition of
"shift" changed since the EHB's decision in United Mine Workers.10 5
The commonwealth court, however, distinguished United Mine
Workers on factual and legal grounds as the case did not consider
the definition of "shift" and did not alter the previously accepted
technical definition. 10 6
The commonwealth court decided the definition of "shift" in
United Mine Workers was contrary to both the historical DEP inter-
pretation and the contextual statutory interpretation.1 0 7 According
to the clear language of the SCA, a court should use a technical
definition when one exists.108 In the mining industry, the term
"shift" technically and historically refers to a block of time and not a
group of workers; therefore, under this meaning, the Act did not
require new examinations to occur for workers who entered the
mine after the initial shift start time. 10 9
Relying on the testimony of mine officials, the commonwealth
court noted it would be physically impossible for an entire shift of
workers to enter the mine at the same time because of structural
103. See id. (noting EHB only consulted common definition).
104. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1069-70 (recognizing evidence provided
to EHB was "virtually ignored"). Evidence proffered included depositions of mine
safety managers, DEP mine safety officials and state mine inspectors. See id. The
court concluded that this evidence supported petitioners' position. See id. at 1070.
105. See id. at 1071 (noting that United Mine Workers created new interpreta-
tion of "shift").
106. See id. at 1071-72 (distinguishing United Mine Workers and concluding its
holding did not affect industry definition of "shift").
107. See id. at 1072 (concluding on matters).
108. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1903(a) (2006) (stating technical words should
be construed according to their peculiar meaning). The applicable technical defi-
nition here is found in the DICTIONARY OF MINING, MINERAL AND RELATED TERMS,
Department of the Interior (1968), which defines "shift" as "[t]he number of
hours or the part of any day worked. Also called 'tour'" or "[t]he gang of men
working for the period; as the day shift or the night shift." See RAG Cumberland, 869
A.2d at 1069 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2095
(Merriam-Webster, Inc. 2002)) (emphasis omitted).
109. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1069 (concluding pre-shift examina-
tions conducted prior to primary shifts sufficiently covers miners who later enter
mines during primary shifts).
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limitations.11 0 The court also reasoned the application of the
EHB's interpretation would lead to "absurd results," including the
perpetuation of never-ending shift inspections.1 ' The common-
wealth court concluded the testimony represented a reliable histori-
cal interpretation because such accounts reflected that it was
standard industry practice for pre-shift examinations to be "effec-
tive for the entire shift and that miners could enter the mine at any
time during that shift without triggering the need for a new
examination."' 1 2
Some cases include arguments opposing this industry standard
argument on the theory that the statutory purpose must override
any countervailing or contradictory interpretations given to the stat-
ute.113 The courts in these cases gave great deference to the DEP's
perceived statutory purpose and attempted to reconcile textual def-
initions with such a purpose. 114 The commonwealth court, how-
ever, did not accept these arguments in RAG Cumberland and
instead held that the DEP's interpretation does not apply. 115
B. Purpose of the Act
The commonwealth court found petitioners' interpretation of
"shift" consistent with the purposes of the BCMA. 116 A portion of
the title of the BCMA suggests one of its purposes: "providing for
the health and safety of persons employed in and about the bitumi-
110. See id. at 1070 (citing Gallick Aff. 21, Bohach Aff. 21; R.R. 113a, 119a)
(noting impossibility of immediate entrance of all workers). As a result of this
physical impossibility, "petitioners and other mine operators have historically
scheduled maintenance workers and some coal-production personnel to start work
at times other than the designated starting time of the coal-producing shift." See
id. at 1070 (citing Gallick Aff. 18-19; R.R. 112a).
111. See id. at 1072 (noting results from continuous mine inspections are un-
necessary, impractical and unintended by legislature).
112. See id. at 1070 (noting petitioners have not conducted pre-shift examina-
tions based on this historical interpretation).
113. See, e.g., United States v. E.I DuPont De Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161, 169
(3d Cir. 2005) (positing statutory purpose must be consulted when faced with am-
biguous terms); Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 876 A.2d 904, 912 (Pa. 2005) (noting com-
mon law usage of term cannot trump statutory use). But see Browning-Ferris, Inc. v.
Dep't of Envtl. Res., 598 A.2d 1057, 1060 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (holding technical
definition of term does not apply when such definition makes statute inconsistent
with legislative intent).
114. For a discussion of some accommodations provided to technical defini-
tions of terms when construing statutory purpose, see supra note 113 and accompa-
nying text.
115. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (holding
"shift" has specific, technical meaning in mining industry).
116. See id. (noting purpose observed by petitioners' interpretation).
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nous coal mines of Pennsylvania."'1 7 In ascertaining legislative in-
tent, the SCA provides it is valid to presume that "the General
Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of exe-
cution or unreasonable."'1 18 Accordingly, although the purpose of
the BCMA was to provide for the health and safety of mine examin-
ers, one may reasonably infer there was a corollary legislative intent
to efficiently run mines for private and public welfare. 119
The commonwealth court further noted that the DEP failed to
produce any evidence demonstrating an increase in safety from the
new interpretation's proposed enhanced safety protocols. 120 The
DEP responded that, although groups that come later in the shift
will trigger the pre-shift examination requirement, an emergency
crew or worker showing up late will not trigger the same require-
ment.12 1 As a result, the EHB concluded the requirement is sensi-
tive to and accommodates the irregular shift circumstances in the
mines. 122 The EHB noted that any administrative difficulties re-
garding the EHB's understanding of the statute as necessitating
multiple examinations per time block were issues for the legislature
to resolve and not the courts. 12 3
C. Deference to Agency Interpretations
Although the commonwealth court recognized that reviewing
courts ordinarily defer to an agency's interpretation of statutory
language, the court held the DEP's new interpretation was contrary
to the historical understanding of "shift" in the industry and was
unsupported by evidence showing that such an interpretation
would improve safety in the mines and created absurd results, and
117. See Commonwealth's Mem. of Law in Supp. of its Mot. for Summ. J.,
supra note 40, at 6, (excerpting portion of BCMA). See also Br. of Intervenor
United Mine Workers of Am. at 3, RAG Cumberland v. DEP, No. 693 CD 2004 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2004) (discussing purpose of BCMA).
118. See Rules of Construction, 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1922 (2006) (providing
basis for interpretative presumptions).
119. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (noting legislative intent to safely,
yet efficiently run mines).
120. See id. (noting lack of information regarding increased safety possibili-
ties).
121. See Op. and Order on Mots. for Summ. J. at 8, RAG Cumberland v. DEP,
EHB Docket No. 2003-067-L (consolidated with 2003-068-L) (issuedJan. 27, 2004)
(noting impact of unscheduled or late workers on pre-shift examination
requirements).
122. See id. (emphasizing adaptability of BCMA to varieties in work sche-
dules).
123. See id. at 10 (reaching conclusion concerning difficulties presented by
multiple pre-shift examinations).
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thus, was undeserving of deference. 124 The court thus concluded
that giving deference to this new interpretation would severely alter
the previous interpretation followed for decades and would create
intolerable inconsistencies. 125 The commonwealth court, there-
fore, concluded "shift" had a technical meaning intended by the
legislature, used prior to United Mine Workers, which defines "shift"
as a block of time, not a group of workers. 126
The commonwealth court, moreover, seemed to criticize the
EHB for accepting the DEP's argument that more inspections
would ensure enhanced safety because the EHB had no evidence
on record demonstrating enhanced safety measures were
needed.1 27 The court pointed out the legislature would not have
intended to "transform the very purpose of a coal mine from coal
production to mine inspection." 128 The pre-shift examinations, al-
ready being conducted effectively, ensured the safety of workers
who entered the mine later during the shift.' 29
D. Holding
The commonwealth court adopted the petitioners' arguments
on appeal. 130 It found the EHB erred both in dismissing petition-
ers' appeal and in giving deference to the DEP's new interpretation
of section 228(a) and determined the inspections as executed satis-
fied the requirements of section 228(a). 13' The commonwealth
court further held "shift" refers to a block of time and is not tied to
the entry of workers into a mine. 32 As such, the court reversed the
124. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (noting that deference not always
applicable). The court noted that under normal circumstances, where statutory
language is clear and unambiguous, an agency's interpretation will usually be
given deference. See id. at 1072 n.1 1 (citing DEP v. N. Am. Refractories Co., 791 A.2d
461, 464 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)).
125. See id. (citing Pa. Sch. Bd. Assoc. v. Pub. Sch. Employees' Ret. Bd., 863 A.2d
432, 441 (Pa. 2004)) (noting deference in situation at issue inappropriate and un-
called for).
126. See id. (concluding that definition of "shift" in BCMA referred to block of
time).
127. See id. (noting lack of evidence of improved safety with additional pre-
shift examinations for odd start times).
128. See id. (noting that statutory purpose was not to eradicate efficiency and
production of mine, but rather to increase safety).
129. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (noting effectiveness of pre-shift
examinations in place at time of dispute).
130. See id. (noting commonwealth court's holding).
131. See id. (reaching conclusion on case issues).
132. See id. (providing holding of commonwealth court).
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EHB's orders because petitioners were not in violation of the
BCMA.133
E. The Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, Senior Judge Flaherty suggested the
only question before the court was one of law - whether there was
a violation of section 228(a).134 Noting the complexities associated
with the statutory interpretation of "shift," Judge Flaherty con-
cluded when there is room for multiple interpretations, the court
must give great deference to the agency's interpretation. 13 5 Judge
Flaherty further opined that this case involved an especially serious
situation, which merited agency deference because the DEP is in
charge of enforcing health and safety standards for mine workers in
a dangerous workplace. 13 6 Citing the SCA, Judge Flaherty noted
that the statute's words were clear and unambiguous and that the
DEP correctly applied its interpretation. 13 7 Judge Flaherty argued
that the new interpretation of "shift" required inspections to be
held when workers entered the mine at later times because under
the statutory interpretation that would be a new "shift. '138
Judge Flaherty agreed with the EHB and found it did not err in
concluding petitioner violated section 228(a) when petitioners did
not perform pre-shift examinations for workers entering later in the
shift.139 Judge Flaherty also noted that although adherence to sec-
tion 228(a) under this interpretation may be burdensome, this is
for the legislature, and not the court, to remedy. 140 His dissenting
opinion concluded that even if the meaning of the term "shift" was
unclear, the court should have given deference to the DEP's inter-
133. See id. at 1073 (expanding on commonwealth court holding).
134. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1073 (Flaherty, S.J., dissenting) (opin-
ing only relevant inquiry was whether there had been violation, not inquiry into
statutory construction and interpretation).
135. See id. at 1074 (Flaherty, S.J., dissenting) (citing Bethenergy Mines Inc. v.
DEP, 676 A.2d 711, 716 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996)) (positing importance of agency
interpretation).
136. See id. (Flaherty, S.J., dissenting) (noting dangerousness of mining at-
mosphere and need for agency deference).
137. See id. (Flaherty, S.J., dissenting) (citing I PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(b))
(asserting it is not court's role to interpret language in situation at issue because
language is unambiguous).
138. See id. (Flaherty, S.J., dissenting) (positing there is requirement for addi-
tional pre-shift examinations for workers entering later in mine).
139. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1074 (Flaherty, S.J., dissenting) (evaluat-
ing EHB doctrinal arguments).
140. See id. (Flaherty, S.J., dissenting) (opining legislature has duty of reme-
dying burdensome or oppressive statutes, not reviewing court).
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pretation of the term because the DEP was charged with enforce-
ment of the statute. 14 1
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In evaluating the definition of "shift," the commonwealth court
had a substantial basis for finding the technical definition ap-
plied.142 The commonwealth court found the definition of "shift"
in United Mine Workers to be contrary to both historical DEP inter-
pretation and statutory contextual interpretation.143 The histori-
cally administered interpretation, as well as the appropriate
technical definition were central to the court's reasoning. 144
"Shift," as commonly used, refers to "a group of people who
work or occupy themselves in turn with other groups . . . [,] a
change of one group of people (as workers or students) for another
in regular alternation; or a scheduled period of work or duty." 145
Adhering to the clear language in the SCA, if and when there is a
technical definition, the court shall use the technical definition.1 46
The technical, historical interpretation of "shift" in the mining in-
dustry interprets "shift" as a block of time, not a group of workers,
and there is no requirement for new examinations to take place
prior to the entrance of workers at irregular shift start times.1 47
The commonwealth court reviewed evidence the petitioners prof-
fered in order to demonstrate that the DEP and mine operators
prior to 2003 referred to the technical meaning and the United Mine
Workers decision should thus be applied here. 48
The commonwealth court awarded no deference to an inter-
pretation of "shift" that followed from the flawed reasoning of the
EHB, which failed to consider the definition of "shift" in United
141. See id. (Flaherty, S.J., dissenting) (concluding on DEP deference).
142. See id. at 1072 (majority opinion) (providing case's holding).
143. See id. (concluding matters).
144. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (discussing historical interpreta-
tion and technical definition of "shift").
145. See id. at 1069 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcrION-
ARY 2095 (Merriam-Webster, Inc. 2002)) (emphasis omitted) (noting DEP's im-
pression of common usage of "shift").
146. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1903(a) (2006) (stating technical words should
be construed according to their peculiar meaning).
147. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (concluding that pre-shift exami-
nations conducted prior to primary shifts sufficiently covers miners who later enter
mines during primary shifts).
148. See id. (noting that new interpretation arose from decision in United Mine
Workers, yet United Mine Workers did not address definition of shift).
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Mine Workers.149 A casual reading of the statutory language in sec-
tion 228 (a) and the historical interpretation and precedent support
the commonwealth court's analysis. 150 Deference to an agency's in-
terpretation is only appropriate if and when the agency's interpreta-
tion is consistent with legislative intent, and the statute's wording is
ambiguous, so as to require further interpretation.151 Here, section
228 (a)'s wording was ambiguous, yet the agency's interpretation of
the statute was at odds with the statute's intended purpose.152
The commonwealth court accurately adopted the petitioners'
contextual argument, pointing out the probable legislative in-
tent.153 SCA section 1903(b) mandates words of a statute must be
restricted by words that precede them. 154 The commonwealth
court followed this language when it analyzed the words surround-
ing "shift" in the Act: "workmen in a shift" and "person on a non-
coal producing shift."'155 The court concluded the concept of
"shift" appeared in the statute as an activity and not as inherently
containing workers. 15 6 The commonwealth court thus had statu-
tory support, supportive precedent and testimony suggesting the
149. See id. at 1071 (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. DEP and Eighty-Four
Mining Co., EHB Docket No. 2001-081-K 2001 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 73, at *2 (issued
Dec. 5, 2001)) (distinguishing facts from United Mine Workers). Specifically, in
United Mine Workers, a mine workers' union convinced the EHB that safety exami-
nations conducted every eight hours were insufficient. See id. (citing United Mine
Workers, 2001 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 73, at *2). The commonwealth court noted that
this is unlike RAG Cumberland, where safety examinations were conducted before
shifts every eight hours, not in the midst of longer ten to twelve hour shifts. See id.
(citing United Mine Workers, 2001 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 73, at *2). Further, the EHB in
United Mine Workers did not consider the definition of "shift" and, thus, did not
alter the definition of "shift" as the industry previously interpreted it. See id. (citing
United Mine Workers, 2001 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 73, at *2).
150. See id. at 1072 n.Il (discussing historical interpretation). Among the evi-
dence considered in rejecting the DEP's "new" interpretation was the DEP's own
expert's testimony (presumably demonstrative of the industry's interpretation of
the requirements imposed by section 228 (a)), precedent and historical interpreta-
tions. See id.
151. See Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 598 A.2d 1057, 1060 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991) (noting deference appropriate unless contrary to intent of
General Assembly); Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 876 A.2d 904, 909 (Pa. 2005) (noting
need for interpretation only when language is ambiguous).
152. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 n.11 (noting DEP interpretation
"abrupt volte-face" from its previously held interpretation).
153. See id. at 1069 (noting statutory construction as viable source in consider-
ing legislative intent). Specifically, the commonwealth court concluded the statu-
tory construction indicated "shift" embodied an activity, rather than a slot of time,
or at the very least, that "shift" and "workmen" are separate concepts. See id.
154. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1903(b) (2006) (noting contextual importance).
155. See 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7 01-228(a) (2007) (considering context of statu-
tory language in interpreting statute).
156. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (concluding "shift" has specific
meaning in coal industry).
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need for a distinction between the new DEP interpretation and the
established interpretation, and therefore, the commonwealth court
properly refused to give deference to the new interpretation. 5 7
The dissent, however, convincingly noted that where ambigui-
ties surround a statute, the court must rely on the guidance and
especially the expertise of the agency in charge of its administra-
tion. 158 Judge Flaherty considered the administrative difficulties in
following section 228(a) an insufficient reason to decrease the
number of mine inspections and thus put miners' lives in peril. 159
Judge Flaherty was well grounded in positing the following: the
DEP correctly interpreted "shift" in the context of section 228(a);
statutory clarity is a goal of all legislatures; and the DEP's interpreta-
tion of "shift" would increase the number of inspections, perhaps
increasing the safety of the mines, even though this supposition has
flaws. 160 Although there has been a drastic reduction in the num-
ber of coal-mining deaths, which is likely due to increased safety
measures, 161 overzealous ambition towards the goal of optimal
safety may, in fact, halt or crush the mining industry itself.162
VI. IMPACT
Agencies generally receive great deference from courts when
they are charged with the authority to interpret a certain statutory
scheme.1 63 The SCA, with the decision in RAG Cumberland, clarifies
that the interpretation must "harmonize with the subject matter"
and purpose of the statute and cannot be an unsupported view.' 64
Although agencies receive significant deference in interpreting stat-
utes, the technical definitions, context and legislative intent can
157. See id. (concluding and refusing to defer to DEP interpretation, instead
relying on former interpretation).
158. See id. at 1074 (Flaherty, S.J., dissenting) (opining need for extraordinary
deference to agency interpretation).
159. See id. (Flaherty, S.J., dissenting) (positing lax enforcement of statutory
regulations will increase risk to miners).
160. See id. (Flaherty, S.J., dissenting) (agreeing with DEP interpretation of
section 228(a)).
161. For a discussion of mine death statistics throughout the 1900s, see supra
note 1 and accompanying text.
162. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (noting ultimate purpose of statute
was to ensure safe mining, not eliminate mining).
163. See, e.g., Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. DEP, 676 A.2d 711, 715 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1996) (noting great deference afforded to agencies).
164. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (noting agency deference guide-
lines). See also Swartley v. Harris, 40 A.2d 409, 411 (Pa. 1944) (noting statutory
interpretation guidelines).
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override a significantly distinct and non-uniform agency
interpretation. 165
The RAG Cumberland decision supports the notion that an
agency's interpretation of a statute cannot be unsupported unless it
is consistent with legislative intent or has been administered for
long periods of time without opposition. 166 This rationale will only
apply when the statute is ambiguous and unclear. 167 If the statute is
unambiguous then the agency interpretation will prevail as long as
it is consistent with legislative intent and purpose. 68 In other
words, after the commonwealth court's decision in RAG Cumber-
land, an agency is not guaranteed unfettered and unreviewable dis-
cretion in interpreting statutes, but instead is required to have
some rational basis aligned with legislative intent and the general
purpose of the relevant statute or act in its interpretation. 169
The decision in RAG Cumberland reaffirms the application of
technical terms in dealing with statutory interpretation. 170 When a
technical definition exists, it must be considered; if the technical
definition presents an ambiguity, the court must resolve the issue if
the legislature does not address this ambiguity.1 71 If an agency's
interpretation of a statute leads to absurd or impracticable results,
the fact that the interpretation stems from an agency decision is not
sufficient to uphold such an interpretation. 7 2 RAG Cumberland will
remind a reviewing court of the need to balance the practicality
and purpose of the relevant statute with legislative intent when in-
terpreting ambiguous terms or statutes.
Dennis C. Lumia
165. See, e.g., Knecht v. Med. Assoc. Serv. of Pa., 143 A.2d 820, 825 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1958) (applying SCA).
166. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (reaching conclusion on issue of
deference to agency).
167. See id. (explaining limited applicability of deference, such as when incon-
sistent with traditional interpretation or definition).
168. See Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 676 A.2d at 715 (noting deference policies).
169. See RAG Cumberland, 869 A.2d at 1072 (describing requirements for def-
erence to agency interpretation).
170. See id. at 1069-70 (explaining technical terms shall be construed accord-
ing to technical definition).
171. See id. (noting technical definition of statutory term and influence on
statutory interpretation).
172. See id. (noting impracticability of agency's interpretation).
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